Glossary
This glossary defines terms that recur across the WDT paper series. Each entry links to every section where the term appears.
\(\tau_0\) The individual WDT entry-level effective rate. The floor for the corporate provisional levy and the rate applied as a provisional final charge to identified intermediaries at the company level. → (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §2), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.3), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §5), (VAL §7), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §5), (CORP §7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §4), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.3), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.1)
\(\tau_h\) The higher unresolved rate applied as a final charge to unidentified beneficial ownership at the company level, and to unattributable positions within an intermediary’s own book. Unlike \(_{prov}\), \(_h\) is a final liability with no downstream reconciliation. Its calibration range is [deterrence floor, \(_m\)]: the floor is set by the deterrence condition net of the refund-forfeiture effect (permanently unattributed positions forfeit access to the symmetric loss-refund mechanism, partially substituting for rate-based deterrence); the ceiling is \(_m\) on revenue-recovery grounds. Legal proportionality does not compress this range materially from above: any beneficial owner who contests \(_h\) must first establish standing by identifying themselves, which is itself an attribution event dissolving \(_h\)’s application. The exit from \(_h\) is always within the claimant’s own control. The Governing Council holds discretion within [deterrence floor, \(_m\)] as a statutory parameter; corporations have no discretion over it. See (CORP.A §B.2) for the full derivation. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (ENV §3), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.5), (CORP §1), (CORP §5), (CORP §7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §1), (RATES §4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1)
\(\tau_m\) The asymptotic ceiling rate of the logistic rate function: the rate the marginal rate approaches but never reaches as wealth grows without bound. At the Balanced calibration, \(_m\) = 70%. → (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (ENV §3), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §5), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.5), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §4), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.2), (RATES §8.3), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.3), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12)
A
Accidental hostage The equilibrium in current tax systems where neither government nor wealthy taxpayers can easily move because exit friction is real and the cost of change is high on both sides, but neither side has made a positive commitment to the arrangement. Distinguished from the deliberate mutual stake the WDT is designed to produce. → (POL §6), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.7)
Accrual-basis taxation Taxation of economic gains as they arise, regardless of whether a realising transaction has occurred. Contrasted with realisation-basis taxation, which taxes gains only when they are converted to cash through sale or exchange. → (WP §2), (WP §2.1)
Acquisition basis The recognised value of an asset at the point it enters the taxpayer’s WDT net worth calculation. For existing wealth at system entry, this is the grandfathered declaration. For subsequently acquired assets, it is the value at the date of acquisition.
Administrator The Administrator is a credential issuer and consistency-confirmer rather than a data custodian or truth-discovery authority; this follows from the delta self-correction mechanism’s own design.” This can sit after the existing sentence ending “Full specification is in (GOV.B §B). → (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (ADD §5), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §6), (ADD §13), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (LR.B §15), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.2), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §8), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4)
Allocator A single person who recommends how the SWF’s available balance is distributed across general government revenue, directed labour relief, and reinvestment. Holds the recommendation function only; the Governing Council retains full authority to adopt, modify, or replace any recommendation. Appointed by T1 vote after proposal by either FS or TP; serves without a term limit; removable by T2 vote with the rebalancing cost falling on the proposing chamber if removal succeeds. Named in this paper as the most capture-vulnerable body in the architecture — a description of a structural feature, not a design flaw. Appointment mechanics, the publication requirement, and public conduct are in (GOV.B §B.2). → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §B.5), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (ADD §4), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §5), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §13), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.1), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §4), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1)
Annual wealth burden Tax paid in a given year expressed as a percentage of existing net worth. Because the tax base is the annual delta rather than the stock, this figure is always a rate applied to growth, not to accumulated wealth. Contrasts with the effective rate on gains. At 2000 Balanced parameters over the canonical 30-year horizon, the population-weighted average is 0.24% and the revenue-weighted average is 0.35% — directly comparable to proposed stock-based wealth tax rates, which are typically 1–2% of net worth annually. → (WP §5), (WP §10), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.2), (RATES §2), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Anti-collusion guarantee The structural requirement that DR’s unanimous opposition be independently sufficient to defeat any joint TP/FS proposal. It is satisfied mechanically by the dual-threshold pass rule at the current 50/25/25 vote-share allocation. Its derivation is in (GOV §3.2); its protection as an enumerated structural clause is clause 9 in (GOV §5.2). → (POL §5), (POL §5.5), (POL §5.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.7), (POL §A), (POL §A.3), (WP §4), (WP §4.2), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §11), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (GOV §1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §8), (GOV §6.4)
Assessment date The fixed annual date on which a listed corporation measures its market capitalisation delta for WDT purposes. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (WP §8), (WP §8.7), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.2), (VAL §1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.1), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7.5)
Assessment window The period over which a taxpayer’s annual delta is averaged for tax purposes. Taxpayers elect a window of one to seven years; annual reporting continues throughout. A premium applies to windows longer than one year, calibrated by the Governing Council against Phase One election data. → (CLOSE §3), (POL §5), (POL §5.4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.2), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.6), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.B §3), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §3.2), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §8), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.4), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §4.4), (CORP §5), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.2), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1)
Assessment window premium The charge paid by taxpayers who elect an assessment window longer than one year. It has two components: a deferral charge reflecting the time value of delayed settlement, and a flexibility levy representing the state’s share of the valuation cost saving the taxpayer captures by assessing less frequently. The premium is symmetric: where delayed assessment produces a refund, the taxpayer receives an equivalent upward adjustment. → (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §8), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §4.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1)
Assessment year The twelve-month period ending on the assessment date. → (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.3), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (MF §7), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4)
Attribution test The operative test applied to every tranche-two holder: whether the intermediary can identify and attribute its underlying beneficiaries to a degree sufficient to support individual WDT reconciliation. Attributability, not entity type, determines treatment. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.4), (BEHAV §8.11), (ENV §3), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.3), (ADD §13), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (CORP §1), (CORP §5), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11)
Authoritarian endurance advantage The demonstrated capacity of authoritarian governance systems to impose costs on populations without electoral accountability, sustaining lower welfare thresholds during external pressure or internal hardship than democratic systems can politically maintain. A real competitive property of authoritarian governance, not a rhetorical concession. → (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3)
Automated valuation model (AVM) A statistical model that generates property valuations using comparable sales data, land registry records, and other observable inputs, without requiring individual professional appraisal. The VOA uses AVMs for standard residential properties. → (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.2), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.10), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.5)
B
Balanced scenario The reference parameter calibration used throughout this paper: \(_0\) = 15%, \(_m\) = 70%, \(k\) = 0.001 per £m, \(W_{min}\) = £2m. The 2000 start year is used as the reference scenario because, under the UK equity return data used, it produces the lowest 10-year post-fill TCM coverage of all 73 viable start years (14.6%), making it the hardest illustrative case on the post-fill revenue dimension. → (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.2)
Behavioural friction Any cognitive or administrative variable that makes honest compliance more costly, more uncertain, or less legible than avoidance or exit. → (BEHAV §4)
Behavioural response A change in how people act because of a tax, such as changing investments, reporting, or location. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §4), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.10), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.5), (BEHAV §11.4), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.2), (CLOSE §1.4), (ENV §2), (ENV §5), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.3), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.2), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §7.2), (WP §8), (WP §8.3), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (WP §10), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.4), (INST §9), (INST §9.3), (LDW §8), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §10), (LR.B §7), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.1), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.9), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §7), (VAL §15), (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.2), (RATES §8.3), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §10)
Behavioural robustness The degree to which a tax system’s effectiveness is independent of any particular assumption about how taxpayers will behave. A behaviourally robust system functions across the distribution of responses rather than only under the assumptions its designers found convenient to make. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §3), (BEHAV §3.1), (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.3), (BEHAV §11.4), (BEHAV §12.2), (BEHAV §13), (POL §1), (FM §4), (WP §8), (WP §8.3), (GOV §1)
Behavioural shape One of nine identified categories of taxpayer response, ranging from full cooperative compliance (Shape 1) to active resistance and non-compliance (Shape 9). The shapes are not predictions about frequency; they are a complete map of the range against which robustness is evaluated. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.3), (CLOSE §3)
Binary equilibrium The strategic structure in which, if the WDT’s properties hold, there are exactly two rational long-run positions (commit to full implementation or prevent demonstration) with no stable intermediate option. → (FM §4)
Bootstrapping facility A time-limited, interest-bearing bridge loan to the SWF Custodian from a public institution, repayable from accumulated WDT revenue and subordinated to refund obligations, intended to collapse the vulnerability window by filling the SRR before organic revenue accumulation would otherwise permit it. → (ADD §2), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §10.3), (ADD §11), (ADD §12), (ADD §13)
Bootstrapping period The period before the full governance architecture is constituted and operational — before chambers are seated, appointments are made, and the system is running. This paper treats it as a real capture surface but assigns its design to the Phase One implementation paper. → (POL §5), (POL §5.8), (POL §6), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (WP §9), (WP §9.5), (GOV §1), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2)
Bootstrapping problem The credibility paradox facing any cooperative institution at introduction: the cooperative architecture only works if participants believe the state will honour its commitments, but the state can only demonstrate that credibly by actually honouring them, which requires participants to have already cooperated. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.8), (FM §4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §10.3), (INST §7), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.3), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.5)
Break-even burden. The annual WDT wealth-equivalent burden at which a representative taxpayer at a given wealth level is indifferent between WDT and the existing tax system, accounting for all economic costs of each.
Bridging facility (exit) The SWF-provided settlement instrument that crystallises an individual’s WDT liability at the declared exit date and allows physical departure before the valuation and settlement process completes.
Bridging facility bond A bond posted before a taxpayer’s physical departure at exit closure, decoupling departure from settlement of the final WDT position. Where the expected exit delta is positive, the taxpayer posts a bond; where it is negative, the SWF posts a bond to the taxpayer; where direction is uncertain, both sides post proportional bonds that net on settlement. The symmetric structure is the state accepting downside exposure at exit on the same terms as the symmetric refund mechanism accepts it during the assessment period. Mandate and sizing are in (GOV.B §E). → (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.5), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8)
C
C.1 metric The total-tax-paid difference relative to honest declaration, expressed as a percentage of the honest taxpayer’s terminal wealth, used in SWEEPS.V as the primary measure of declaration incentive consequences across parameter values. → (VAL §5), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §10.1)
Capital flight The movement of people or assets to lower-tax jurisdictions in response to a tax. → (POL §3), (POL §3.1), (POL §10), (ENV §1), (INST §6), (INST §6.4), (FAL §12)
Capital velocity The rate at which capital is redeployed from one use to another across an economy, as distinct from its aggregate level or return. → (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §10)
Capitalisation window The period from SRR fill to LRR fill during which the WDT is fully operational, the refund guarantee is credible, and the LRR is actively accumulating toward its floor target. At the 2000 Balanced reference scenario this window runs from year 3 to year 19, a span of 16 years. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.5), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §6), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §11)
Capture The redirection of an institution’s operations away from its founding purpose by actors whose interests conflict with that purpose. Treated in this paper as the default long-run state of any institution, rather than an exceptional event. The design standard is comparative: harder to capture than the alternatives, not capture-proof. → (BEHAV §2), (BEHAV §2.2), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.3), (POL §3), (POL §3.5), (POL §4), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.5), (POL §5.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.4), (POL §A), (POL §A.4), (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.3), (ENV §5), (ENV §8), (ADD §4), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.2), (ADD §7.4), (ADD §8), (ADD §13), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.5), (WP §7), (WP §7.3), (WP §9), (WP §9.3), (WP §9.5), (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.1), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §5), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §5.2), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.3), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §3), (MF §3.2), (MF §6), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.2), (MF §9.4.5), (MF §11), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.2), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §8), (LR.B §14), (LR.B §16), (LR.B §17), (LR.B §18), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.4), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §2), (CORP §3), (GOV §1), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §8), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §9)
Category 1 infrastructure The enabling institutions and legal frameworks that the WDT requires and that also have independent justification outside the WDT: a professional valuation system with published standards, a public valuation register, beneficial ownership attribution law, a sovereign wealth fund in the generic sense, and independent fiscal governance in the generic sense. → (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4)
Category 2 mechanisms The mechanisms that are constitutively WDT-specific and have no independent justification outside the full architecture: the symmetric refund at the marginal tax rate, the declaration equilibrium, the Route D auction mechanism, the lifetime contribution envelope, and the three-chamber Governing Council structure. → (MOD §1), (MOD §3)
Certainty-equivalent welfare (CEW) The proportional change in consumption under a no-tax counterfactual that would make an agent indifferent to the taxed system. Negative values indicate a welfare cost relative to the no-tax benchmark.
Chamley-Judd result The theoretical finding, established independently by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), that the optimal long-run tax rate on capital income in a general equilibrium model is zero. The result has been substantially qualified by subsequent work, particularly Straub & Werning (2020).
Classification veto label A label any voter may attach to their substantive vote simultaneously and at no additional cost, signalling that a proposal should be treated as structural. A simple majority of votes cast carrying the label triggers reclassification to Tier 2. Label counts are published in real time by the Administrator. The mechanism is complementary to the seat-burn: the label is a continuous aggregated signal; the seat-burn is a targeted individual escalation. Full mechanics are in (GOV.B §C.4). → (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6.4)
Closure event Any event by which an individual’s WDT assessment position ends. The four closure event types recognised by this paper are death, jurisdictional exit, threshold fall-through, and bankruptcy. Each triggers the same general settlement sequence, with event-specific procedural differences. → (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.4), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §11)
Codetermination A corporate governance arrangement, most developed in German law, under which employees hold seats on a company’s supervisory board alongside shareholder representatives.
Collective production argument A two-level claim about the relationship between private wealth and collective frameworks. The ontological level holds that large-scale wealth is constituted by collective frameworks — property rights, contracts, equity positions, legal title — not merely supported by them; wealth of the kind the WDT taxes cannot exist outside those frameworks. The causal level holds that the direction and magnitude of accumulation depends on the labour, consumption, and tax contributions of the broader population. Both claims are independent; the ontological claim is prior. Together they ground the WDT’s position that proportional contribution to maintaining the conditions enabling accumulation is morally appropriate, not merely politically convenient. → (MF §1), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (LR.B §16)
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) The OECD framework for automatic exchange of financial account information between participating jurisdictions. CRS continues to apply to the UK post-Brexit and covers the majority of offshore financial account information relevant to WDT compliance. → (LR.B §18), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3)
Compliance friction (Type V) The direct cost of complying honestly with a tax system — professional advice, record-keeping, time spent navigating rules — which functions as a tax on honest engagement and can make avoidance or restructuring economically preferable to remaining within the base.
Compounding head start The accumulated advantage of the first WDT-adopting jurisdiction across all dimensions — valuation infrastructure, adviser ecosystem knowledge, sovereign wealth fund reserves, behavioural evidence base — that cannot be recovered by later movers at equivalent cost. → (INST §7), (INST §7.3)
Conditional support. An evidentiary outcome in which a hypothesis holds only within an identifiable parameter range, with the binding constraints explicitly characterised.
Constituency dissolution mechanism The automatic response to a sustained fall in DR’s volunteer rate. When the rate falls below a sustained floor, the monthly lottery draw count increases by a fixed step; it decays back asymmetrically once recovery is sustained, with the decay window longer than the expansion trigger. DR cannot set any of the mechanism’s parameters. Full specification is in (GOV.B §A.3.3). → (ADD §6), (ADD §10.1), (FAL §10), (LR.B §12), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.5)
Consumption delta The fiscal treatment of income that is consumed rather than accumulated as net worth. The consumption delta is not a gap in the WDT’s mechanism but a question about whether the loop through which consumed income becomes someone else’s taxable delta closes completely for all asset and transaction types. → (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.2), (ADD §7.4), (ADD §12), (ADD §13)
Consumption multiplier The amplification of an initial income change through successive rounds of spending; here, the feedback loop from labour tax relief to consumer expenditure to corporate revenue to WDT-taxable asset appreciation. → (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §5), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §9), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2)
Cooperative architecture The design principle, derived from MF, that the WDT treats taxpayers as participants in a reciprocal arrangement rather than as subjects of a unilateral extraction. The symmetric loss-refund mechanism is its operational expression; governance participation by the taxpayer population is its institutional expression. → (BEHAV §7), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (POL §2), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.4), (POL §6), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.6), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.3), (ENV §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §3.6), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §A), (WP §A.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.4), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (MF §7), (MF §8), (MF §9), (MF §9.1), (MF §9.2), (MF §11), (LR.B §10), (LR.B §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §8), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3)
Corporate delta The raw change in a listed company’s market capitalisation from one assessment date to the next. This is the tax base for the provisional levy. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.5), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (ENV §3), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.2), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.2), (WP §5), (WP §6), (VAL §12.1), (CORP §2), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.3), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.3)
Correlated-shock assumption The SSM’s distributional assumption that every taxpayer experiences the same historical return in every year simultaneously. This maximises simultaneous refund pressure and minimises net tax income, making it the worst-case stress test for the reserve structure. → (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4)
Countercyclical instrument A policy mechanism whose stabilising effect operates in the opposite direction to the business cycle — withdrawing stimulus during expansion and providing it during contraction — without requiring active discretionary intervention. → (ENV §7), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.4), (GOV §6.4)
Credible commitment problem The structural difficulty faced by any government that needs to make long-term fiscal promises binding on its successors. In the WDT context: the symmetric refund guarantee is only cooperatively credible if it cannot be suspended at governance discretion; this requirement creates a constitutional constraint incompatible with concentrated executive authority.
Credit The amount released against a native shareholder’s individual WDT liability on confirmed settlement within the reconciliation window. Equal to \(_{prov}\) multiplied by the shareholder’s allocated corporate delta. A hard legal claim against the company, not contingent on adequate provisioning. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.3), (CLOSE §1.4), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §8.4), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.3), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §A), (WP §A.3), (INST §3), (INST §3.1), (LDW §5), (LDW §8), (MF §4), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.1), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.4), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.3), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.2), (VAL §10.5), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §12.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §11), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3)
Cross-base externality The fiscal loss in parallel taxes (principally income tax and value added tax) that results from wealth-tax-driven emigration; identified in the Phase One context by Agrawal et al. (2025) at approximately six times the direct wealth-tax revenue loss. → (BEHAV.A §D), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.2), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (ADD §13), (INST §10), (INST §10.3), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.2), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.2), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §18), (RATES §10)
Cross-base revenue loss The fiscal loss associated with wealth-tax-driven emigration that extends beyond the wealth tax itself to include income tax and VAT revenues attributable to the departing taxpayer, as documented in Agrawal et al. (2025).
D
DAC (Directive on Administrative Cooperation) The EU framework for automatic exchange of tax information among member states, providing broader asset-class coverage than CRS alone. The UK lost access to DAC on leaving the EU, with residual gaps concentrated in EU-domiciled holding structures.
Declaration equilibrium The population-level stable declaration strategy under the WDT’s incentive structure; established in VAL.A as mild overstatement near \[ \] 1.1 rather than exact honest declaration. The rationale is refund-protection asymmetry under valuation uncertainty, not a genuine economic return to overstatement: the nominal TW_settled advantage of mild overstatement does not survive NPV adjustment (VAL.A §C.12). → (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (MOD §1), (ADD §2), (VAL §7), (VAL §10.1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Declared value The value a taxpayer submits for an asset. For automatically priced assets, the declared value is determined by market price. For professionally valued assets, it is determined by the certified assessment. For self-declared assets, it is determined by the taxpayer’s own submission. → (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.3), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.2), (ENV §2), (ENV §7), (WP §2), (WP §2.6), (WP §3), (WP §3.7), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (INST §5), (INST §5.1), (INST §5.2), (INST §5.3), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (VAL §1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.2), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.3), (VAL §12.4), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §12.1), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §10)
Deferral charge The component of the assessment window premium that compensates the state for the time value of delayed settlement. It accrues from the date each liability falls due. → (WP §3), (WP §3.6), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §8), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.3), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (RATES §4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1)
Deliberate mutual stake The equilibrium the WDT aims to produce through Phase One accumulation: both the state and the taxpayer have made real commitments that are costly to reverse (the state through pre-funded obligations, the taxpayer through accumulated entitlement), not merely inconvenient to exit. → (POL §6), (POL §6.2)
Delta The annual change in an individual’s net worth, assessed at fair market value on a fixed annual date, above the exemption threshold. The WDT taxes positive deltas at progressive marginal rates and refunds a proportional share of negative deltas at the same rates. Defined in (WP §3.1). → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.5), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.5), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §5), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §8.2), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.5), (CLOSE §10), (POL §5), (POL §5.6), (ENV §2), (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §4.7), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.1), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (FM §4), (MOD §4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.2), (ADD §7.4), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.3), (WP §2.5), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.6), (WP §3.7), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §6), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §8.2), (WP §8.7), (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (WP §9.2), (WP §A), (WP §A.4), (INST §5), (INST §5.1), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.3), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (LDW §2), (LDW §8), (FAL §1), (FAL §1.3), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §8), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (MF §1), (MF §2), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (MF §4), (MF §6), (MF §8), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6), (LR.B §8), (LR.B §16), (VAL §1), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §3.3), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.1), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §5.3), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.2), (VAL §12.3), (VAL §12.4), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §12.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.3), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.1), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §8), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.1), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.3), (RATES §10), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Delta base The annual change in net worth assessed at a taxpayer-elected interval. The tax applies to the change measured across the elected assessment window rather than to a single year’s raw change. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.5), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (POL §5), (POL §5.6), (ENV §3), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.3), (WP §2.5), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (FAL §1), (FAL §1.3), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §8), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §4), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §8), (RATES §2), (RATES §10), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1)
Democratic flourishing The terminal goal of the WDT. The preservation of conditions under which democratic institutions remain functional, ordinary people retain meaningful political participation and a material stake in the continuation of the social order, and the wealthy retain the security and institutional predictability that makes extraordinary accumulation possible at comparatively low cost. A mutual-interest condition rather than a purely egalitarian objective. → (POL §5), (POL §8), (POL §8.6), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.4), (POL §A.6), (POL §A.7), (WP §A), (WP §A.4), (LDW §8), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (MF §6), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.7), (LR.B §16)
Desk research Analysis conducted without access to data generated by the operation of the mechanism itself; the limit of what the companion paper series can establish. → (POL §6), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (SCOPE §1), (ADD §13)
Developmental authoritarianism A governance arrangement in which a concentrated ruling authority deliberately maintains separation between economic and political power — permitting private wealth accumulation while preventing its conversion into political faction — in exchange for rapid industrialisation and growth. The canonical cases are South Korea under Park Chung-hee, Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, Taiwan under the KMT, and China through the Deng-to-Hu period. Distinct from predatory authoritarianism, which fuses economic and political power in the governing coalition. → (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.4)
Displacement channel The mechanism through which WDT revenue converts into macroeconomic effect by replacing existing taxes rather than adding to the total fiscal burden. → (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.4), (ENV §10), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §9), (INST §9.2), (LDW §4)
Dividend Recipient Chamber (DR) The third chamber of the Governing Council, holding 50% of total vote share. Membership is filled by monthly birth-month lottery with staggered one-year terms. DR holds no proposing right. Its vote share is fixed by the anti-collusion guarantee and is an enumerated structural clause rather than a calibration parameter. Full composition and mechanics are in (GOV.B §A.3). → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §2), (BEHAV §2.1), (BEHAV §3), (BEHAV §3.3), (BEHAV §4), (BEHAV §4.1), (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.1), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.4), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §7.8), (BEHAV §7.9), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV §12.1), (BEHAV §12.2), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §B.5), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.2), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.2), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.3), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (POL §1), (POL §2), (POL §3), (POL §3.1), (POL §3.4), (POL §4), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.3), (POL §5.5), (POL §5.6), (POL §5.7), (POL §6), (POL §6.7), (POL §7), (POL §8), (POL §8.6), (POL §8.7), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.3), (POL §A.6), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.4), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §4.8), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §8), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (SCOPE §7), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §4), (ADD §5), (ADD §6), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.3), (ADD §8), (ADD §9), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §10.3), (ADD §11), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §2.2), (WP §2.6), (WP §2.7), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.5), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §4.2), (WP §4.3), (WP §5), (WP §6), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (WP §8.3), (WP §8.5), (WP §8.7), (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (WP §9.3), (WP §10), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §1), (INST §2), (INST §2.1), (INST §2.2), (INST §3), (INST §3.2), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §6.4), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.2), (INST §9.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.1), (INST §10.2), (INST §10.5), (INST §11), (LDW §1), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.2), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.2), (LDW §4.5.3), (LDW §5), (LDW §6), (LDW §6.2), (LDW §6.4), (FAL §1), (FAL §1.3), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.2), (FAL §3.3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §7.3), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §8), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §2), (MF §3), (MF §3.2), (MF §8), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.5), (MF §9.4.8), (LR.A §1), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.1), (LR.A §3.2), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1), (LR.A §4.2), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §1), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §8), (LR.B §11), (LR.B §12), (LR.B §13), (LR.B §14), (LR.B §16), (LR.B §17), (LR.B §18), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.4), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §1.5.4), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.2), (JUR §2.3), (JUR §2.8), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.4), (VAL §5), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.2), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §2), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.3), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.1), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.2), (RATES §10), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §8.5), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
Domar-Musgrave (D-M) property The result that a proportional tax with full symmetric loss offsets contracts the agent’s net return distribution without altering relative risk rankings, leaving the risk-taking incentive intact.
Domar-Musgrave mechanism The property, established by Domar & Musgrave (1944), that symmetric government participation in investment outcomes — taxing gains and refunding losses at the same rate — reduces the after-tax variance of risky investment without a proportional reduction in expected return.
DR-eligible pool The population of adults who are neither TP members nor FS members, from which the Dividend Recipient Chamber’s lottery selection draws. The pool size is a byproduct of threshold and enrolment dynamics rather than a directly controlled parameter. → (ADD §6), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2)
Dual-threshold pass rule The voting rule governing all Governing Council proposals. A proposal passes only if (1) nays stay strictly below the nay threshold, and (2) yays exceed nays among votes actually cast, with non-votes excluded from the denominator. At the current 50/25/25 allocation the two conditions are not independent: condition 1 is automatically satisfied whenever condition 2 holds. Full worked arithmetic is in (GOV.B §C.1). → (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §6.4)
E
Effective rate on gains Tax paid expressed as a percentage of the annual wealth increase. Because gains on accumulated wealth are typically a fraction of the stock, this figure is structurally larger than the annual wealth burden for the same taxpayer. The maximum effective rate on gains at 2000 Balanced parameters is 27.2%, at the Great tier and top 0.01%+ bracket, as a lifetime average over the canonical 30-year burden horizon. The gain-weighted average across the modelled population is 13.0% — directly comparable to a statutory CGT or income tax rate applied to aggregate gains. → (WP §5), (RATES §2), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Empirical boundary The point at which a design question cannot be answered by further analytical work and requires evidence from a live system. → (FM §4)
Enabling infrastructure The Category 1 institutions whose independent justification makes them candidates for accretion through locally rational policy decisions unconnected to the WDT. → (MOD §1), (MOD §3)
Endogenous institutional pressure The mechanism by which an authoritarian state attempting to satisfy the WDT’s four operating conditions generates internal pressure toward the democratic accountability structures those conditions ultimately require. The WDT does not impose democratisation externally; it creates conditions under which the institutional distance between “stable WDT equilibrium” and “democratic governance” narrows with each operating cycle. → (INST §1), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.4), (INST §8), (INST §10), (INST §10.4)
Enumerated structural clauses The ten properties the WDT system must preserve to remain the same kind of tax. Any proposal touching them triggers automatic Tier 2 review and a permanent rebalancing cost on conclusion. The list is itself on the list. The clauses are set out in (GOV §5.2); the full protection rationale is in (GOV §5.2). → (BEHAV §7), (POL §5), (POL §5.6), (ENV §7), (ADD §2), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (WP §4), (WP §4.2), (WP §8), (WP §8.5), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (LR.B §15), (GOV §1), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.3), (GOV §6.4), (SWEEPS §1)
Epistemic tiers The three-level classification maintained throughout this paper distinguishing demonstrated results (Tier A), derived implications (Tier B), and hypothetical evolutionary claims (Tier C). Introduced in the Abstract; applied section by section.
Exemption threshold The net-worth level above which an individual falls within the WDT system. Set high enough to exclude the substantial majority of households, on both administrative-cost grounds and a moral judgment about differential capacity to bear bad years. → (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.3), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.3), (WP §3.4), (WP §7), (WP §7.2), (WP §A), (WP §A.5), (MF §2), (MF §8), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.3), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.4), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Exit closure The event by which a taxpayer’s WDT assessment position ends on jurisdictional departure. The mechanism settles the accrued running account without treating departure as an act requiring a fiscal penalty. The full position closure framework is in (CLOSE). → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.1), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §5), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §8.2), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.3), (CLOSE §10), (SCOPE §7), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (WP §9), (WP §9.4)
Exit valuation service The taxpayer-initiated process that opens formal valuation on Route D assets at the declared exit date, using the inheritance-auction machinery described in (VAL §6.5), with the taxpayer’s own declared annual values serving as the opening bid floor. → (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §5), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.3)
F
Falsification. An evidentiary outcome in which a hypothesis fails across empirically defensible parameter ranges, or survives only under assumptions that are themselves implausible. → (FAL §12), (FAL §13)
Feedback friction (Type IV) The experience of delay and unpredictability in the system’s response to taxpayer action, which causes the institution to be experienced as unresponsive regardless of whether the substantive outcome is correct.
First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) The initial appellate body for disputes between HMRC and taxpayers across all UK tax types. Relevant to WDT as the venue for contested valuation disputes and the Route D auction process. → (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.4)
Fiscal architecture The specific combination of tax instruments, base definitions, rate structures, governance mechanisms, and constitutional protections that define how a state extracts revenue from economic activity. Treated in the institutional fitness literature as a fixed parameter of governance systems; this paper argues it is a variable that can alter the comparative fitness of those systems. → (ENV §10), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.2), (ADD §13), (WP §10), (INST §3), (INST §3.1), (INST §3.2), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §6.4), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §8), (INST §10), (INST §10.4), (INST §10.5), (INST §11), (MF §4), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §16)
Fiscal rule A statutory or constitutional constraint on a government’s fiscal choices, typically expressed as a limit on the deficit, debt, or rate of expenditure growth. → (WP §8), (WP §8.5), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (LR.B §15), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3)
Fiscal Sovereign Chamber (FS) The second chamber of the Governing Council, holding 25% of total vote share at baseline. Membership is tied to constitutional office in the relevant jurisdiction. FS office supersedes TP membership immediately. Full composition and mechanics are in (GOV.B §A.2). → (BEHAV §4), (BEHAV §4.3), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.8), (BEHAV §13), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (POL §5), (POL §5.5), (POL §5.8), (POL §7), (ENV §2), (ENV §3), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (FM §3.2), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §3), (ADD §4), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §6), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.3), (ADD §13), (WP §2), (WP §2.5), (WP §4), (WP §4.2), (WP §5), (WP §8), (WP §8.7), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §9), (INST §9.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.3), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §8), (FAL §12), (MF §9), (MF §9.3), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.1), (JUR §1.2.4), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.4), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.2), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.1), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §8.5), (SWEEPS §9)
Flexibility levy The component of the assessment window premium that represents the state’s share of the valuation cost saving the taxpayer captures by electing a longer window. It scales with window length. → (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.2), (WP §3), (WP §3.6), (VAL §8), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.3), (RATES §4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1)
Fresh question A problem that the WDT creates through its own novelty and which the existing literature has not yet encountered. Distinct from a literature gap, which is a problem the literature has engaged with and left unresolved. → (LR.A §1)
Fungible asset An asset that can be fractionally transferred without losing its character, primarily company equity, fund units, and partnership interests. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.1), (BEHAV.A §A.3), (ENV §3), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.2), (LR.B §8), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.2), (VAL §2.3), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §5.3), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.4), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.4)
G
Governance decay The gradual degradation of an institution’s capacity to perform its intended function without any single discrete act causing it. Four sub-forms are identified in (GOV §7) and developed in (GOV.A §E): definitional drift, procedural calcification, role-fidelity drift, and constituency dissolution. The first three are irreducible; the fourth is tractable. → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (GOV §4), (GOV §8), (GOV §6.4)
Governing Council The political governing body of the WDT system, comprising the three chambers (TP, FS, DR) and operating under the dual-threshold pass rule. It holds authority over all structural and ordinary proposals, and retains full authority to adopt, modify, or replace Allocator recommendations. The executive bodies hold no Governing Council votes. → (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §12.5), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.2), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.5), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §6), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.6), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.7), (POL §8.8), (POL §A), (POL §A.3), (ENV §2), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.5), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §4), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §5), (ADD §6), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.4), (ADD §8), (ADD §9), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §10.3), (ADD §11), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.6), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §4.2), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §1.2), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (LDW §7.2), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.1), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (MF §9), (MF §9.5), (LR.B §12), (LR.B §13), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (JUR §3), (JUR §4.5), (VAL §8), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.1), (CORP §9.2), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.4)
Grandfathered wealth Net worth existing at the point a taxpayer enters the WDT system. No WDT is owed on grandfathered wealth. The taxpayer’s entry declaration establishes the recognised basis for future delta calculations.
Growth tier One of four persistent return differentials applied in the TCM relative to the UK historical equity mean of 10.45% per annum: Poor (−4.55pp, 10% of active taxpayers), Ok (−2.05pp, 30%), Good (+0.95pp, 40%), and Great (+3.45pp, 20%). Derived from Fagereng et al. (2020). The population-weighted mean of differentials is zero, recovering the historical mean. → (WP §5), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.3), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.1), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §11)
H
Haig-Simons definition The definition of income as the sum of consumption and the change in net worth over a period, developed independently by Haig (1921) and Simons (1938). The most widely accepted theoretical baseline in tax economics. → (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (LR.B §2)
Haig-Simons definition of income A broad definition that treats income as consumption plus the change in net worth. It therefore includes unrealised gains. → (WP §2), (WP §2.1)
Harberger mechanism The self-assessment enforcement device proposed by Harberger (1965): a taxpayer who declares a value pays a levy on it but must also accept a standing obligation to sell at that declared price, creating an incentive to declare honest values without requiring independent state appraisal. → (LR.B §9)
Hard basis reset Voluntary settlement of a Route D liability using an auction to establish market value, rather than self-declaration. The auction price becomes the new recognised basis. The mechanism is the same as the inheritance auction, applied at the taxpayer’s election. → (VAL §4), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §6.5), (GOV §6.4)
HMRC (His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) The UK’s primary tax collection authority and the assumed administrative home for WDT operations in the UK reference jurisdiction.
Hostile modelling. Modelling conducted by researchers with every incentive and opportunity to demonstrate that a hypothesis fails, rather than by the hypothesis’s proponents.
I
IFS (Institute for Fiscal Studies) Independent UK economic research body. The IFS, through Advani et al. (2020) and related work, provides the principal supplementary estimates of UK wealth concentration used where WAS data is inadequate.
Information friction (Type I) Uncertainty about liability arising from complexity or ambiguity in the rules, which drives route-shopping and professional avoidance activity independently of the headline rate. → (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3)
Infrastructure accretion The process by which Category 1 institutions are assembled incrementally through independent policy decisions, each locally justified, such that a jurisdiction may arrive at near-complete WDT-enabling infrastructure without having evaluated the WDT as a whole. → (MOD §4)
Inheritance auction The price-discovery mechanism triggered when a Route D asset passes to an heir. The asset is offered at public auction to establish a market value. That auction price becomes the realisation value for WDT purposes. The heir may retain the asset by paying the WDT liability calculated on that basis. If the estate does not pay, the asset is sold at the auction price and the liability is settled from proceeds. → (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §11.5), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §10.1), (GOV §6.4)
Institutional brittleness The third failure mechanism of wealth taxes. The process by which individually defensible concessions (exemption expansions, threshold adjustments, enforcement under-resourcing) accumulate into structural hollowing of a tax that then becomes cheap to abolish. Each step is defensible; the cumulative effect is invisible until complete. → (POL §3), (POL §3.5), (POL §4), (POL §5), (POL §5.5), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1)
Institutional fitness The degree to which a governance arrangement can repeatedly produce sufficient welfare, output, fiscal capacity, legitimacy, and adaptability to remain competitive over generational timescales. Distinguished from regime survival, which can be achieved through coercion without welfare maximisation. → (INST §1), (INST §11)
Institutionally mediated compliance The compliance posture adopted not by a taxpayer directly but by the professional network (advisers, family offices, trustees, corporate structures) through which ultra-high-net-worth individuals conduct their financial affairs.
K
k The steepness parameter of the logistic rate function, expressed per £m of net worth. Controls how quickly the marginal rate rises through the wealth distribution. At the Balanced calibration, \(k\) = 0.001 per £m. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §2), (BEHAV §2.1), (BEHAV §4.6), (BEHAV §3), (BEHAV §3.1), (BEHAV §3.2), (BEHAV §4), (BEHAV §4.1), (BEHAV §4.2), (BEHAV §4.3), (BEHAV §4.4), (BEHAV §4.5), (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.4), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.1), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.1), (BEHAV §8.2), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §7.9), (BEHAV §7.10), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.1), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §9.5), (BEHAV §11.1), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV §12.1), (BEHAV §12.2), (BEHAV §13), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.1), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.3), (BEHAV.A §A.4), (BEHAV.A §A.5), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §B.5), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (BEHAV.A §C), (BEHAV.A §C.1), (BEHAV.A §C.2), (BEHAV.A §C.3), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.1), (BEHAV.A §D.2), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.1), (CLOSE §1.2), (CLOSE §1.4), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §5), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §9.3), (CLOSE §9.4), (CLOSE §10), (POL §1), (POL §2), (POL §3), (POL §3.1), (POL §3.2), (POL §3.3), (POL §3.4), (POL §3.5), (POL §3.6), (POL §3.7), (POL §4), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.2), (POL §5.3), (POL §5.4), (POL §5.5), (POL §5.6), (POL §5.7), (POL §5.8), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.6), (POL §6.7), (POL §7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.2), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.4), (POL §8.5), (POL §8.6), (POL §8.7), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.1), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.3), (POL §A.4), (POL §A.5), (POL §A.7), (ENV §1), (ENV §2), (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.3), (ENV §4.4), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §4.7), (ENV §4.8), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §8), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (ENV §9.2.2), (ENV §9.2.3), (ENV §9.2.4), (ENV §9.3), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (FM §1), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (FM §3.2), (FM §4), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.2), (SCOPE §3.3), (SCOPE §7), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §4), (ADD §5), (ADD §6), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.3), (ADD §7.4), (ADD §8), (ADD §9), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §10.3), (ADD §11), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §2.2), (WP §2.3), (WP §2.4), (WP §2.5), (WP §2.6), (WP §2.7), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §3.7), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §4.2), (WP §4.3), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §6), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §7.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §8.2), (WP §8.3), (WP §B.2), (WP §8.5), (WP §8.6), (WP §8.7), (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (WP §9.2), (WP §9.3), (WP §9.4), (WP §9.5), (WP §10), (WP §A), (WP §A.2), (WP §A.3), (WP §A.4), (WP §B), (INST §1), (INST §2), (INST §2.1), (INST §2.2), (INST §2.3), (INST §3), (INST §3.1), (INST §3.2), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.1), (INST §5.2), (INST §5.3), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §6.4), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (INST §9.2), (INST §9.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.1), (INST §10.2), (INST §10.3), (INST §10.4), (INST §11), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §1.2), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.1), (LDW §2.2), (LDW §3), (LDW §3.1), (LDW §3.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.1), (LDW §4.2), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §4.4), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.1), (LDW §4.5.2), (LDW §4.5.3), (LDW §4.5.4), (LDW §4.5.5), (LDW §5), (LDW §6), (LDW §6.1), (LDW §6.2), (LDW §6.3), (LDW §6.4), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (LDW §7.2), (LDW §7.3), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §1), (FAL §1.1), (FAL §1.2), (FAL §1.3), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.2), (FAL §3.3), (FAL §3.5), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.1), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.2), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §6.4), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.3), (FAL §8), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §9.3), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §2), (MF §3), (MF §3.2), (MF §3.3), (MF §4), (MF §6), (MF §7), (MF §8), (MF §9), (MF §9.1), (MF §9.2), (MF §9.3), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.7), (MF §9.4.8), (MF §11), (LR.A §1), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.1), (LR.A §3.2), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1), (LR.A §4.2), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §1), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §8), (LR.B §9), (LR.B §10), (LR.B §11), (LR.B §12), (LR.B §13), (LR.B §14), (LR.B §15), (LR.B §16), (LR.B §17), (LR.B §18), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.1), (JUR §1.2.2), (JUR §1.2.3), (JUR §1.2.4), (JUR §1.2.5), (JUR §1.3), (JUR §1.4), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.1), (JUR §1.5.2), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §1.5.4), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.1), (JUR §2.2), (JUR §2.3), (JUR §2.4), (JUR §2.5), (JUR §2.6), (JUR §2.8), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §2.11), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.1), (JUR §3.2), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.1), (VAL §2.2), (VAL §2.3), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §3.2), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.1), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §5.3), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §7.4), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.2), (VAL §10.5), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §11.5), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §12.3), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §3), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.1), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.1), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.3), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.1), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.3), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.1), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.2), (RATES §8.3), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.3), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §8.6), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12)
L
Labour dividend The constitutionally committed reduction in taxes on labour and consumption funded by WDT surplus revenue above the SWF floor targets. The mechanism through which the WDT’s terminal goal — democratic flourishing — is actually pursued. Also the mechanism through which a majority constituency with a direct financial stake in the WDT’s continuation is created. → (POL §5), (POL §5.7), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §8), (POL §8.3), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.3), (POL §A.6), (FM §2), (ADD §6), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.2), (INST §1), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §7), (INST §7.2), (INST §8), (INST §10), (INST §10.2), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.4), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2)
Labour Relief Reserve (LRR) The larger of the SWF’s two internal reserves. Receives net WDT income above the SRR’s target balance in each year. Its floor target is 3 years of prevailing government expenditure. The LRR breakeven year is the primary SSM output and the horizon to which the TCM is calibrated. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.7), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.3), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §2), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §A), (LR.B §14), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (CORP §6), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
Labour tax relief dividend The progressive reduction in taxes on wages and consumption that WDT revenue is intended to finance. The mechanism through which the terminal goal is actually pursued rather than merely stated. → (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (FM §1), (WP §6), (WP §7), (WP §7.2), (WP §10), (WP §A), (WP §A.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.5), (MF §1), (MF §6), (MF §11), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.3), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.5)
Legitimacy collapse The first failure mechanism of wealth taxes. The condition in which a tax perceived as purely extractive, offering no visible reciprocal benefit, loses public support even among those who do not pay it. Distinguished from unpopularity: a tax can be popular in surveys while suffering legitimacy collapse if the perceived reciprocity is absent. → (POL §3), (POL §3.3), (POL §3.6), (POL §4), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.3), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1)
Legitimacy friction (Type III) Perceived procedural unfairness in the operation of the tax system, which erodes compliance outcomes even among taxpayers who would benefit financially from the system’s continuation. → (BEHAV §7)
Lever test The derivation test applied in (GOV §3). A governing body is justified if and only if it is the unique holder of some lever the mechanism’s own transactions create — some transaction that cannot execute without this specific party. Shared interest and political intuition do not satisfy the test. → (GOV §1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.1), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3)
Lifetime contribution envelope The cumulative constraint that refunds received cannot exceed taxes paid over a taxpayer’s full WDT participation history. It persists across assessment position closures and re-entries. Defined in (WP §3.5); interaction with closure events is in CLOSE. → (BEHAV §3), (BEHAV §3.2), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.4), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.1), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §10), (POL §6), (POL §6.2), (MOD §1), (ADD §2), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (INST §8), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.3), (LR.B §3), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §4.1), (CORP §11), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4)
Lock-in distortion A tax-induced distortion that penalises the movement of capital from its current allocation to a more productive use, by making realisation a taxable event; associated primarily with capital gains tax on an accrual-realisation differential. → (ENV §4), (ENV §4.4), (ENV §6), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §10), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §8), (LR.B §3)
Logistic rate function The functional form $$(W) applied to annual wealth deltas. Rises smoothly from \(_0\) at \(W_{min}\) to an asymptotic ceiling of \(_m\). Specified by four parameters: \(_0\), \(_m\), \(k\),and \(W_{min}\). See (RATES §4) for the full expression. → (FAL §3), (FAL §3.3), (VAL §10.1), (RATES §2), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.3), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Long-run reserve (LRR) The WDT’s accumulation vehicle for Phase Two fiscal replacement, funded from post-SRR surplus. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.7), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.3), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §2), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §A), (LR.B §14), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (CORP §6), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
Loss offset Tax relief or a refund for losses that balances the tax charged on gains. → (WP §2), (WP §2.5), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4)
LRR breach year Under the zero-governance assumption (no Governing Council rate adjustments after LRR fill) the first year in which cumulative post-fill expenditure outflows exhaust the LRR balance. A planning indicator, not a prediction of system behaviour under active governance.
LRR breakeven year The first year in which the LRR balance reaches its recommended capitalisation floor of 3 years of government expenditure. At the 2000 Balanced reference scenario this occurs at year 19. The maximum across all 73 start years is 29 (the 2006 and 2007 start years); the median is 13 years. → (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §6), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.4)
LRR coverage ratio See TCM post-fill coverage.
LRR fill year The first year in which the Labour Relief Reserve balance reaches the three-year-expenditure floor, gating full Phase Two viability. → (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
M
Mark-to-market Valuing an asset according to its current market price or best current estimate of value. → (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.7), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §8), (VAL §1), (VAL §15), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1)
Mechanism-shaped test The five-condition test any proposed governance feature must satisfy before it is accepted as a structural safeguard: (1) works with the enforcer deleted; (2) cost and act are the same transaction; (3) cost is proportional to the size of the act; (4) cost is in a currency the actor cannot discount; (5) no actor defines the inputs that determine its own cost. Developed in (GOV §2.1); applied throughout the paper. → (POL §A), (POL §A.4), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1)
Membrane calcification The tendency of a mature institution to preserve Membrane processes that made sense at implementation even when the taxpayer population and behavioural distribution have changed. Addressed in (BEHAV.A §B). → (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV §12.2), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.7)
Membrane health The aggregate condition of The Membrane across the five friction dimensions. → (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.2), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (BEHAV.A §C), (BEHAV.A §C.1), (POL §5), (POL §5.8), (ADD §5), (ADD §9.2), (GOV §6.2)
Membrane-first sequencing The implementation principle that the administrative layer governing taxpayer experience must be operational before or simultaneous with the first assessment cycle, not developed in parallel with it.
Memetic diffusion The spread of institutional arrangements across governance systems through recognition of competitive advantage rather than direct imposition or emulation. In this paper’s usage: the process by which recognition of the WDT’s competitive advantages would propagate adoption pressure across governance types, generating one of four response options (adopt, suppress, race, conflict) whose dynamics and costs differ systematically by governance tier. → (SCOPE §1), (INST §8)
Minimum-tax floor A coordinated international standard setting a minimum effective tax rate on ultra-high-net-worth individual wealth, as proposed in Zucman (2024) and under development in the UN Tax Committee model law process. → (SCOPE §1), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.B §18)
Mode B governance failure The failure mode in which the state honours the WDT’s mechanics while abandoning what the mechanics exist to serve. It has two forms: the discrete form (outright revenue diversion, substantially closed by enumerated clause 6) and the drift form (valuation methodology loosening gradually, irreducible and addressed through residue). Introduced in (GOV §4). → (GOV §4), (GOV §5)
Modular adoption The adoption pathway by which a jurisdiction moves toward WDT readiness through infrastructure accretion rather than through a single political commitment to the full architecture. → (MOD §1), (MOD §3), (MOD §4)
Morally survivable equilibrium The condition the WDT aims to maintain: an equilibrium in which the majority retains sufficient political participation and material stake to tolerate concentrated wealth, while the wealthy retain sufficient security and institutional legitimacy that they have reason to preserve the democratic order. Neither elimination of wealth concentration nor indifference to it; a mutually sustainable coexistence, managed rather than resolved.
N
N-crossing threshold The holding period N at which aggressive overstatement first becomes more expensive than honest declaration, marking the point at which the self-limiting correction has activated. In this paper, the threshold is tracked for \[ = 1.5, \] = 1.8, and $$ = 2.0; at canonical parameters these cross at approximately N = 21, 20, and 20 respectively (Table B.4.5). → (VAL §10.1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §11)
Named compromises The eight points (MF §9.4.1) through (MF §9.4.8) at which the WDT’s theoretical foundations and its practical design part company, stated as trade-offs under constraint rather than as natural extensions of the underlying theory. → (WP §A), (WP §A.5), (MF §11), (LR.B §16)
Native shareholder An individual within scope of individual WDT assessment as a domestic taxpayer. → (CORP §5), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §11)
Nay threshold The maximum number of nay votes a proposal may receive without failing condition 1 of the dual-threshold pass rule. Defined as equal to DR’s vote share and tracks it automatically. At the current 50/25/25 allocation, T = 50. → (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6.4)
Net worth rate The marginal WDT rate applicable to the taxpayer, determined by their total declared net worth at the point of formal assessment.
Non-decomposability The property of the WDT mechanism by which each component is structurally required by the others; no component can be omitted without producing a different system that fails in predictable ways. → (FM §2), (MOD §1), (INST §8)
Non-domination Pettit’s criterion for freedom: a person is free not merely when no one currently interferes with them, but when no party possesses arbitrary power over them that could be exercised at discretion without institutional check. Distinguishes structural equality (equal political standing, freedom from domination) from material equality (equal resources). The WDT’s terminal goal is better characterised through non-domination than through egalitarianism: the concern is unaccountable power, not unequal ownership. → (MF §6)
Non-fungible asset An asset that cannot be fractionally transferred without destroying or materially changing it. Houses, art, jewellery, collectibles, and similar assets fall here. Routes B and D apply to non-fungible assets. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.1), (ENV §3), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (LR.B §8), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.3), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.4), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §15), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.4)
O
OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility) The UK’s independent fiscal watchdog, established in 2010 and placed on a statutory footing in 2011. Provides the primary institutional precedent for the WDT’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Custodian role in the UK reference jurisdiction.
Option B The suppression strategy available to governments whose position depends on preventing WDT demonstration — operating through information control, counter-narrative, partial imitation that breaks the mechanism, and isolation from jurisdictions demonstrating the advantage. Distinguished from active opposition, which leaves the mechanism available for later adoption. China’s August 2026 National Defence Mobilization Law revision is examined in (INST §6.4) as a case consistent with domestic Option B dynamics: pre-emptive suppression of the institutional conditions under which WDT adoption would become conceivable. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (POL §3), (POL §3.2), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (INST §6), (INST §6.4), (INST §8), (INST §10), (INST §10.5), (VAL §10), (VAL §11.5), (CORP §8)
Oracle failure One of three failure modes in the (GOV.A §A) taxonomy. A mechanism is oracle-dependent when its operation requires an external report of what actually happened that the mechanism itself cannot verify independently. Whoever controls that report controls the system without touching its formal structures. → (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1)
Organised opposition advantage The second failure mechanism of wealth taxes. The structural asymmetry in which a small, identifiable, well-resourced group with concentrated interests in abolition outperforms a large, diffuse population whose individual stake in continuation is too small to organise around. → (POL §3), (POL §3.4), (POL §4), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (INST §4), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1)
P
Parameter separability The property whereby the four rate-function parameters are doing largely independent jobs across the declaration-incentive and fiscal dimensions, such that calibrating one does not require simultaneous revision of the others. → (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1)
Partial adoption Implementation of some WDT components without others, most commonly the tax base without the symmetric refund, or either without the constitutional governance structure. Partial adoption is not a weaker version of the WDT; it is a different system. → (FM §1), (INST §6), (INST §8)
Phase One The initial implementation period during which the WDT operates at a high threshold and low rate affecting a small population, building valuation infrastructure, capitalising the refund reserve, and generating the behavioural evidence required before the system scales. → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §11.1), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV §11.4), (BEHAV §12.1), (BEHAV §12.2), (BEHAV §13), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.2), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §9.3), (CLOSE §9.4), (CLOSE §9.5), (POL §3), (POL §3.2), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.6), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.8), (POL §A), (POL §A.5), (ENV §1), (ENV §2), (ENV §5), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (ENV §9.2.2), (ENV §9.2.3), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (FM §1), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (FM §3.2), (FM §4), (MOD §3), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (SCOPE §3.2), (SCOPE §3.3), (SCOPE §8), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §5), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §8), (ADD §9), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §11), (ADD §13), (WP §2), (WP §2.5), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.6), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §7.2), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §8.3), (WP §8.5), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (WP §9.3), (WP §9.4), (WP §9.5), (INST §1), (INST §2), (INST §2.3), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (INST §9.2), (INST §9.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.1), (INST §10.2), (INST §10.3), (INST §10.4), (INST §10.5), (INST §11), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §1.2), (LDW §3), (LDW §3.1), (LDW §3.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.2), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.5), (LDW §6), (LDW §6.1), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (LDW §7.3), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.3), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §7), (FAL §8), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.1), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (MF §9), (MF §9.2), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.6), (LR.A §1), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.2), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §11), (LR.B §18), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §8), (VAL §9), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.1), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.1), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §7), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.1), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.3), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.6), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12)
Phase One empirical question A question that can only be answered by a live implementation generating data. Distinct from a literature gap, which is an analytical or evidential failure in the existing scholarly record. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (SCOPE §1), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §11), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.5), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (FAL §2), (LR.A §1), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.3), (RATES §10)
Political robustness The degree to which an institution’s survival is independent of any particular assumption about the political environment it operates in. A politically robust institution functions across the distribution of governments, political cycles, and opposition coalitions it will encounter, not only under the conditions its designers assumed. → (POL §4)
Population-coverage parameter A parameter whose primary consequence is determining how many taxpayers are subject to the mechanism, rather than what the mechanism does to those already in scope. \(W_{min}\) is the population-coverage parameter in the WDT rate function. → (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4)
Position closure The general condition in which an individual’s WDT assessment position ends and a final settlement is calculated. Distinct from position suspension, which does not occur under the design proposed here: all events that might have been treated as suspension are instead treated as closure events, with re-entry above the threshold treated as a new first entry. → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.7), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.1), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §9.3), (CLOSE §10), (FM §4), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §11), (GOV §1)
Positive feedback loop. The chain of mechanisms by which WDT-induced improvements in capital allocation and labour tax displacement are hypothesised to amplify one another, increasing both the WDT tax base and broader welfare over time.
Procedural justice The principle, developed most fully by Tyler (1990), that people’s willingness to comply with rules and authority depends substantially on their perception of the process as fair, regardless of the substantive outcome. → (FAL §5), (FAL §7.4), (LR.B §10)
Prospective participation The moral basis for taxing future wealth deltas rather than existing wealth stocks. New wealth created after the WDT’s reciprocal terms are publicly known is accumulated within a framework whose obligations are understood in advance. Taxing future deltas is therefore participation in a mutually understood arrangement, not retrospective imposition. → (MF §1), (MF §3), (MF §3.3), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.6)
Provisional levy The amount the corporation pays into the settlement account on the assessment date: \(_{prov}\) multiplied by the corporate delta, where \(_{prov}\) is at least \(_0\). The corporation sets the rate; it bears the shortfall risk of its own choice. → (CORP §1), (CORP §5), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.1), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §11), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1)
R
Re-entrant An individual who previously held a WDT assessment position, experienced a closure event, and subsequently re-enters the WDT’s scope, either by returning to the jurisdiction after exit or by rising back above the exemption threshold after threshold fall-through. → (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.2), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.3), (CLOSE §10)
Realisation event A transaction or circumstance that produces an observable market value for an asset, including arm’s-length sale, public auction, and the inheritance auction process. For Route D assets, the realisation event is the point at which the WDT liability is calculated and settled. → (ENV §2), (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.5), (WP §1), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.8), (LR.B §3), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.3), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.1), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §2), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4)
Rebalancing cost The permanent vote-share consequence that attaches to a proposing chamber on Tier 2 conclusion. The proposing chamber’s share moves toward the other proposing chamber by a fixed increment; DR’s share is never affected; total system vote share is conserved. The cost is flat per proposal and has no floor. Full arithmetic is in (GOV.B §D). → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (POL §7), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (SWEEPS §1)
Reciprocal partnership The working characterisation of the state/taxpayer relationship under the WDT, adopted in (MF §7). The state accepts downside exposure alongside the taxpayer through the symmetric refund, rather than participating only in gains. → (POL §5), (POL §5.4), (MF §7), (MF §8)
Reconciliation window The one-year period from the assessment date within which native shareholders must settle their individual WDT for that year and register their credit claim. Fixed for all native shareholders regardless of their individual rolling assessment window length. → (CORP §5)
Redundancy (institutional) The property of an institution whose features serve multiple independent functions simultaneously, such that the failure of any single function does not remove the feature. Distinguished from mere complexity: redundancy aligns the incentives of multiple constituencies rather than accumulating administrative layers.
Reference jurisdiction A specific country selected to ground the WDT’s companion papers in concrete institutional data, population figures, and legal context. The reference jurisdiction does not constrain the whitepaper’s generic mechanism design. → (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.1), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.2), (SCOPE §7), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.3), (RATES §1)
Residue Durable assets — the Public Valuation Register, the SWF’s actuarial record, the permanent published decision archive — that survive a captured period and give a future legitimate effort the raw material to reconstruct what happened and rebuild from it. The honest response to the three irreducible sub-forms of governance decay. → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.5), (CORP §7), (GOV §2), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.4)
Resource-defines-truth degeneration One of three failure modes in the (GOV.A §A) taxonomy. A mechanism degenerates into resource-defines-truth when removing all human discretion from an evaluation does not eliminate capture but instead redefines it as acquiring enough of whatever the mechanism counts. → (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1)
Revenue equivalence The condition under which all systems are calibrated such that the expected tax collected equals the same target as a proportion of initial wealth — here, E[T] = 2% of \(W_0\). → (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (WP §B), (WP §B.2), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §13), (FAL §A), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.B §6), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §10)
Role-fidelity drift One of the four sub-forms of governance decay. A body’s actual conduct loosens away from its mandate without any formal amendment. Close to undetectable in real time. Addressed through residue mechanisms — stewardship statements, three-body corroboration statistics, the Administrator’s format-consistency requirement — rather than prevention. → (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §8)
Route C rotation The process by which the SWF receives equity stakes through Route C in-kind settlement and rotates them into low-correlation assets under its standing investment mandate. → (ENV §7), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §10), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
Route D auction mechanism The Route D auction mechanism operates across three distinct pathways, each with its own trigger and tax treatment. The corrective auction fires following corroborated Valuation Body consensus that a declared value is an egregious statistical outlier in either direction. The voluntary hard-reset auction is initiated by the taxpayer to obtain a market-tested basis without Valuation Body involvement. The inheritance auction fires automatically on transfer at death. All three share the same auction mechanics: the asset is offered at the most recent recognised declared basis as the opening price, any willing buyer may bid, and the highest bid becomes the new recognised basis. Tax treatment differs by pathway and direction of discovery. Full specification is in (VAL §11) and (GOV.B §G). → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (ENV §3), (WP §2), (WP §2.6), (WP §2.7), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.7), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §8.3), (WP §8.5), (WP §9), (WP §9.4), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §6.3), (LR.B §9), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.4), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.3)
S
Scrutiny period The interval between the intellectual case for the WDT becoming publicly available and any jurisdiction committing to Phase One implementation. During this period no adoption has occurred and the suppression strategy remains viable. → (FM §1), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4)
Seat-burn The act by which a DR member triggers an immediate and permanent Tier 2 review by vacating their seat. The burn is irrevocable; the member is excluded from the resulting Tier 2 vote. After a Tier 1 vote has concluded, a seat-burn is the only route to retrospective Tier 2 review. Full mechanics are in (GOV.B §C.3). → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4)
Self-defeating dynamic The structural mechanism by which authoritarian attempts to implement comprehensive wealth taxation are undermined by the fact that the wealth-holding population is also the support coalition. Taxing the former at scale constitutes an existential threat to the latter. Distinct from the broader difficulty all governments face in taxing mobile capital: the self-defeating dynamic operates even when the wealth-holding population is immobile, because the threat is political rather than fiscal.
Self-referential power One of three failure modes in the (GOV.A §A) taxonomy. A mechanism suffers from self-referential power when the actor being scored holds enough influence over the outcome they are scored against that their score becomes partly a function of their own choices. → (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1)
Self-shaping problem The condition in which a political institution changes the political interests of the people inside it, such that the political environment the institution operates within is partly produced by the institution itself. The WDT’s institutions generate new constituencies, new interests, and new political conflicts as a consequence of operating. → (POL §7), (POL §10), (POL §A)
Settlement account The dedicated account into which the provisional levy is paid and from which credits are released. Closes for each assessment year one year after the assessment date. → (VAL §12.1), (CORP §5)
Short-run reserve (SRR) The ring-fenced reserve capitalised in the early years of the WDT, which makes the refund guarantee mechanically credible within a single political cycle. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.8), (ENV §2), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (ADD §2), (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §13), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.5), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (INST §10), (INST §10.3), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §10), (LR.B §14), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.5), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
Slippery slope framework Kirchler’s (2007) model of tax compliance in which the equilibrium compliance rate is jointly determined by the authority’s enforcement power and taxpayers’ trust in the authority. High trust supports voluntary compliance; low trust requires high enforcement power to produce equivalent outcomes. → (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.1), (LR.B §10)
Soft basis reset Voluntary settlement of a Route D liability using a taxpayer self-declaration to establish the new recognised basis. The taxpayer declares a current value, pays the WDT liability on the gain from entry basis to that value, and the basis resets. The Route D auction mechanism remains available for egregious declarations. References throughout this paper to (VAL.A §A) through (VAL.A §F) refer to sections of the mathematical and simulation companion (VAL.A): (VAL.A §A) (mathematical model and propositions), (VAL.A §B) (simulation methodology), (VAL.A §C) (simulation tables), (VAL.A §D) (mechanism cases), (VAL.A §E) (route specification tables), and (VAL.A §F) (annual reporting requirements). Worked examples tethered to this paper’s five claims are in (VAL.B), with each example lettered (VAL.B §J) through (VAL.B §O) to match the claim it illustrates. → (VAL §4), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (GOV §6.4)
Solvency floor The hard threshold expressed as a ratio of the SWF’s liquid assets to its aggregate outstanding liabilities, below which automatic consequences follow without requiring a Governing Council vote. Aggregate bridging facility commitments count toward the ratio on the same basis as the refund liability. Full specification is in (GOV.B §E.1). → (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (ENV §6), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (GOV §1), (GOV §4), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4)
Sovereign Wealth Fund A state-owned investment fund, capitalised from government revenues, managed at institutional arm’s length from the fiscal ministry. Examples include Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, Singapore’s GIC and Temasek, and Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund. → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.2), (POL §5), (POL §5.2), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.4), (FM §1), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §4), (WP §4.2), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §10), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (MF §1), (MF §7), (LR.B §13), (LR.B §14), (VAL §13), (CORP §7), (GOV §1), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4)
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) The pre-funded vehicle that capitalises the WDT’s refund liability. Its sole capitalisation purpose is pre-funding the refund liability; this is an enumerated structural clause. It comprises two internal reserves: the SWF Refund Reserve (SRR) and the Labour Relief Reserve (LRR). Governed by the SWF Custodian under a hard solvency floor. → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.2), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §5), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.5), (POL §5), (POL §5.2), (POL §5.4), (POL §5.6), (POL §5.7), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §6.5), (POL §10), (ENV §2), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.4), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (FM §1), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (MOD §3), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §11), (ADD §12), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.6), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §4.2), (WP §4.3), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (WP §10), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §7), (INST §7.3), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §4.4), (LDW §6), (LDW §6.3), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (LDW §7.2), (LDW §8), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §5.2), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §7), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.B §1), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §13), (LR.B §14), (LR.B §15), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §13), (CORP §5), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.1), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §7), (GOV §1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.3), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4)
SRR capitalisation ratio The SRR target balance expressed as a multiple of net annual WDT income under normal conditions. The SSM-derived working value is 2.77×; the recommended Governing Council floor is 3×. → (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
SRR fill year The first year in which the SRR balance reaches its capitalisation target. Invariant at 3 across all 73 start years in the historical sweep under Balanced parameters. → (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
SSM post-fill coverage The average, over a given window of years after LRR fill, of the Step-5 labour-relief surplus (net WDT income remaining after SRR maintenance and LRR floor obligations are satisfied) expressed as a fraction of annual government expenditure. Computed for 5, 10, 20, and 50-year windows; years where the LRR balance is zero contribute zero to the average. Reflects the correlated-shock assumption and provides the floor on post-fill revenue capacity. At the 2000 Balanced reference scenario, the 10-year SSM post-fill coverage is 6.4%. Contrasts with TCM post-fill coverage. → (RATES §3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1)
Stock wealth tax A tax on the total accumulated value of net worth at a point in time, as distinct from a delta-based tax on the annual change in net worth. → (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (POL §8), (POL §8.8), (ENV §3), (WP §2), (WP §2.3), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §B), (WP §B.2), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §6), (FAL §6.4), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §10), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §18), (RATES §10)
Support. An evidentiary outcome in which a hypothesis holds across a substantial range of empirically defensible parameters. A model that can be made to work by choosing favourable parameters does not meet this standard. The hypothesis must hold across a substantial and realistic range, not merely somewhere within it. → (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §12.2), (POL §3), (POL §3.1), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.6), (WP §10), (INST §2), (INST §2.2), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.3), (LR.B §11), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (GOV §6.4)
Suppression strategy The set of actions by which actors with access to relevant policy environments prevent any jurisdiction from reaching Phase One demonstration, without necessarily opposing the WDT publicly. The strategy does not require coordination or bad faith; it operates through the alignment of rational institutional interests with outcomes that prevent demonstration. → (POL §3), (POL §3.2), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4)
SWEEPS.R The parameter sweep dataset examining how the four rate-function parameters (\(_0\), \(_m\), k, \(W_{min}\)) affect fiscal outcomes (TCM coverage ratio and LRR fill year). → (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
SWEEPS.V The parameter sweep dataset examining how the four rate-function parameters affect declaration incentive properties (tolerant zone width, N-crossing threshold, understater penalty plateau ceiling). → (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §11)
SWF Custodian The executive body managing the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Its existence is stated as a design choice rather than derived from the lever test. It holds a singular mandate: protecting the long-term stability of the fund. It is designated through statutory mandate extension of a pre-existing long-tenure, constitutionally insulated financial institution. In the UK reference jurisdiction, this maps to the Bank of England. Mandate and institutional mapping are in (GOV.B §E). → (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.3), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §6.4)
SWF Refund Reserve (SRR) The ring-fenced internal reserve whose sole purpose is to guarantee the symmetric refund obligation. Its target balance is the SRR capitalisation ratio times net annual WDT income. The SRR has first claim on net annual income in each year; surplus above the target flows to the LRR. SRR fill year is invariant at 3 across all 73 start years in the historical sweep. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §6.7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.8), (ENV §2), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (ADD §2), (ADD §8), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §13), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §5), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.5), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (INST §10), (INST §10.3), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §9), (FAL §9.2), (FAL §10), (LR.B §14), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §10.1), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §9.5), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.5), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.5), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.2)
SWF Solvency Model (SSM) A transition-planning instrument that applies the actual historical UK equity return sequence uniformly to the entire taxable population in each year, tracking year-by-year capitalisation of the SRR and LRR. Its primary output is the LRR breakeven year. A stress-test instrument, not a revenue forecast. → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.1), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.2), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §11.1), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.4), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.4), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.2), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §10), (POL §5), (POL §5.4), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.3), (ENV §3), (ENV §6), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (SCOPE §3.2), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §4), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §1), (WP §2), (WP §2.6), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.5), (WP §3.6), (WP §3.7), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.2), (WP §8.7), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (WP §10), (WP §A), (WP §A.5), (INST §5), (INST §5.1), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.2), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (FAL §2), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.5), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.3), (MF §2), (MF §7), (MF §9), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.2), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §9), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.1), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.5), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.1), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §3.2), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.1), (VAL §4.2), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.1), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.2), (VAL §6.3), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §8), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §10.2), (VAL §10.4), (VAL §10.5), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §14.5), (VAL §15), (VAL §4.3), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §3), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.1), (CORP §6.2), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.6)
Symmetric loss-refund mechanism The WDT’s provision that in years of negative wealth delta the state pays the taxpayer a refund at the same marginal rate that would have applied to an equivalent gain, subject to the lifetime contribution envelope. Full symmetry is a settled design position (RATES §4). → (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (SCOPE §1), (WP §1), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.5), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (WP §10), (MF §1), (MF §7), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.B §11), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.4), (GOV §1), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.3)
Symmetric refund The mechanism by which the state refunds a proportional share of wealth losses at the same marginal rate that would have applied to equivalent gains, funded through the sovereign wealth fund. → (BEHAV §4), (BEHAV §4.2), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §7.2), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.4), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §10), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.2), (POL §5.4), (POL §5.7), (POL §6), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.4), (POL §10), (ENV §1), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (MOD §1), (ADD §2), (WP §2), (WP §2.7), (WP §3), (WP §3.5), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §6.4), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §7), (MF §8), (MF §11), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §4.4), (GOV §1), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.5)
Symmetric WDT A flat-rate variant of the WDT in which the tax rate on gains equals the refund rate on losses. → (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.B §4)
T
Tax gap The difference between the theoretical tax liability in the UK and the amount actually collected. Stood at £46.8 billion (5.3%) in 2023-24. The WDT primarily addresses the portion attributable to wealthy individuals. → (FAL §3), (FAL §3.2), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.1), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.2), (JUR §2.5), (JUR §2.10), (VAL §7)
Tax-base migration The movement of the principal fiscal base from labour income toward capital appreciation as the underlying production structure changes, here used to describe the property of the WDT tax base that it tracks value change regardless of how that change was generated. → (ENV §4), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.5)
Taxpayer Chamber (TP) The first chamber of the Governing Council, holding 25% of total vote share at baseline. Membership is a byproduct of WDT filing above the threshold; no separate registration is required. Each member holds an equal fractional share of the chamber’s total external vote regardless of wealth. Full composition and mechanics are in (GOV.B §A.1). → (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.2), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.2), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §B.5), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (POL §2), (POL §3), (POL §3.4), (POL §5), (POL §5.4), (POL §5.5), (POL §6), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §7), (POL §8), (POL §8.4), (POL §8.7), (POL §A), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.3), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §4.7), (MOD §2), (MOD §4), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §4), (ADD §5), (ADD §6), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §11), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §3), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §5), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §4), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.4), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.3), (LDW §8), (FAL §3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.2), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §8), (FAL §10), (LR.B §12), (LR.B §15), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §3), (JUR §3.3), (VAL §9), (VAL §10.1), (GOV §1), (GOV §1.1), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.1), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.2), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §8), (RATES §2), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.1), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §8.4), (SWEEPS §8.5), (SWEEPS §11)
Taxpayer Cohort Model (TCM) A model that computes cumulative tax and refund flows for a representative taxpayer in each of forty wealth-bracket-by-growth-tier cells, using the actual historical return series rotated to the active scenario’s start year plus each tier’s persistent differential. Calibrated to the LRR breakeven year produced by the SSM. Evaluates taxpayer experience and aggregate revenue during the capitalisation window and at maturity. → (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (VAL §10.1), (RATES §1), (RATES §3), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.2), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.3), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.4), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
Taxpayer history record A mandatory Administrator output comprising each taxpayer’s longitudinal participation record: taxes paid, refunds received, lifetime contribution envelope balance, and assessment window elections over time. Subject to periodic deposit at designated archival institutions with independent preservation mandates. Protected by the Administrator’s transmission mandate; no enumerated clause required. → (POL §A), (POL §A.6), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.3), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.4)
TCM coverage ratio Average annual TCM net revenue over the capitalisation window as a share of average annual government expenditure; the primary measure of the mechanism’s fiscal scale. → (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3)
TCM post-fill coverage The average, over a given window of years after LRR fill, of the Step-5 labour-relief surplus computed using heterogeneous persistent tier differentials rather than the SSM’s correlated-shock assumption, expressed as a fraction of annual government expenditure. Reflects the persistent-heterogeneity assumption, where higher-tier taxpayers compound faster and generate higher average post-fill revenue. At the 2000 Balanced reference scenario, the 10-year TCM post-fill coverage is 14.6%. Across all 73 start years the 10-year TCM post-fill coverage ranges from 14.6% (2000 start) to 321.4% (1970 start), with a median of 125.5%. Contrasts with SSM post-fill coverage; see (RATES.A §A.6). → (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (RATES §3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (RATES §7.2)
The Membrane The permeable boundary between a tax system and the taxpayers it governs — the layer of procedures, communications, defaults, and feedback loops through which the taxpayer experiences the institution and through which the institution receives information from the taxpayer. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.1), (BEHAV §6.2), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.1), (BEHAV §8.2), (BEHAV §8.3), (BEHAV §8.4), (BEHAV §8.5), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §7.8), (BEHAV §7.9), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §9.3), (BEHAV §9.4), (BEHAV §11.1), (BEHAV §11.2), (BEHAV §13), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.1), (BEHAV.A §B.3), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (BEHAV.A §C), (BEHAV.A §C.2), (WP §8), (WP §8.3), (INST §6), (INST §6.3), (INST §8)
Three-way ratio The published breakdown of every concluded Governing Council vote into yay, nay, and non-vote shares of total possible votes. Published by the Administrator as a mandatory output alongside every vote result. Functions as a continuous legitimacy signal independent of the pass/fail outcome. → (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6.4)
Threshold drift The process by which nominal asset appreciation, particularly in housing, pulls a growing share of the population across a fixed nominal exemption threshold without any discrete enrolment event that would make the crossing visible to the affected individual. → (POL §5), (POL §5.6), (POL §8), (POL §8.7), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §6), (ADD §11), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1)
Tier 1 The default voting regime. TP and FS vote under the dual-threshold rule; DR is notified and may participate but is not required to. Full mechanics are in (GOV.B §C.2). → (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.5), (INST §2), (INST §2.1), (INST §3), (INST §3.2), (VAL §8), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §6), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §10), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.5), (GOV §6.4), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §10), (RATES §9.5)
Tier 2 The escalated voting regime, triggered automatically by any proposal touching an enumerated structural clause, by a classification veto label majority, or by a DR seat-burn. All chambers must participate; DR participation is mandatory on pain of automatic seat loss. The rebalancing cost attaches on conclusion regardless of outcome. Full mechanics and timing scenarios are in (GOV.B §C.3). → (POL §A), (POL §A.3), (ADD §2), (INST §2), (INST §2.1), (INST §3), (INST §3.2), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (INST §8), (INST §10), (INST §10.5), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.4), (SWEEPS §1)
Tier A / B / C See epistemic tiers.
Tiered citizenship The formal, institutionally recognised distinctions between people based on their relationship to a mechanism (WDT participants, dividend recipients, lottery members, the broader public) that emerge from the mechanism’s own transactions rather than from deliberate design. Argued in Appendix A to be more accountable than the current system’s informal and invisible equivalent. → (POL §8), (POL §8.4), (POL §8.5), (POL §8.6), (POL §8.8), (POL §A), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.5), (POL §A.7)
Tolerant zone The range of declaration multipliers ($$ values) around honest declaration within which the total tax paid difference relative to an honest declarer remains below a defined threshold. Governed primarily by the steepness parameter k. Defined formally in (VAL.A §A.2.5), (VAL.A §A.6). → (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §12.1), (WP §3), (WP §3.8), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §10), (INST §5), (INST §5.2), (INST §5.3), (INST §6), (INST §6.3), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.1), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.1), (VAL §14.2), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.1), (SWEEPS §2.2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §12)
Tranche One of three ownership categories for the provisional levy. Tranche one covers native shareholders; tranche two covers identified intermediaries; tranche three covers unidentified beneficial owners. → (WP §3), (WP §3.2), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.2), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §9.5), (CORP §11), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1)
Transmission channel The specific causal pathway through which a tax change produces an effect on economic behaviour, prices, or output; the mechanism linking cause to consequence. → (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (ENV §1), (ENV §2), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.3), (ENV §9.4), (FM §4), (LDW §1), (MF §6)
Two-constituency mechanism The political dynamic in which two non-overlapping constituencies — wealthy taxpayers requiring protection of the symmetric refund and valuation architecture, and the working majority with a direct financial stake in the labour dividend — converge on identical governance requirements: constitutional constraint on executive discretion, mandatory transparency, independent oversight. Their demands are structurally resistant to executive division; any attempt to separate them collapses either the revenue base or the dividend itself. Qualitatively different from single-constituency representation pressure in the taxation→democratisation literature. The architecture gives constitutional form to this mechanism: DR, derived from the anti-collusion guarantee, is the second constituency institutionally seated rather than a political force expected to arise — a lottery-drawn chamber holding 50% of Governing Council vote share by structural necessity (GOV §3.2). → (INST §5), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.4)
U
Understater penalty plateau ceiling The maximum C.1 value reached by egregious understatement at high growth rates before the rate function saturates; the primary measure of deterrence at the extreme tail of the understatement distribution. → (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1)
Unrealised gain An increase in the value of an asset that has not yet been sold. → (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.1), (WP §7), (WP §7.3), (LR.B §3), (CORP §2), (RATES §2)
Untaxed pool The approximately $286 trillion in household wealth held in Tier 4 and Tier 5 governance systems, which their governing states cannot efficiently access through cooperative mechanisms — not for technical reasons but for structural ones rooted in the self-defeating dynamic. A further $228 trillion in Tier 1 and Tier 2 systems has been similarly inaccessible to democratic states through prior wealth tax mechanisms, for the three political failure reasons identified in (INST §4). → (INST §3), (INST §3.1)
Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) The appellate body hearing points of law from the First-tier Tax Chamber. The second tier of the UK’s tax dispute system. → (JUR §1), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.4)
Use-it-or-lose-it mechanism The efficiency argument for wealth taxation when returns on capital are persistently heterogeneous, formalised by Guvenen et al. (2023): a wealth tax falls equally on all holders of equivalent wealth regardless of return, shifting the relative burden toward unproductive holders and improving aggregate capital allocation compared to a capital income tax. → (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.2), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6)
V
Valuation Bodies Three independent bodies operating under identical mandates that carry out professional valuation on Routes A and B, and execute the three-body sealed-estimate protocol for the Route D auction trigger. Hard institutional separation — no shared staff, leadership, or institutional home — is required by design. Terms are staggered to prevent simultaneous reshaping. Full appointment mechanics and the sealed-estimate protocol are in (GOV.B §B.1). → (WP §4), (WP §4.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.5), (WP §B), (WP §B.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.3), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.4), (VAL §1), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §12), (VAL §12.1), (VAL §12.2), (VAL §12.3), (GOV §3), (GOV §3.1), (GOV §3.2), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §6), (GOV §6.1), (GOV §6.3), (GOV §6.4)
Valuation Office Agency (VOA) An executive agency of HMRC responsible for property valuations underpinning business rates and council tax across England and Wales. Provides the institutional starting point for WDT property valuation in the UK reference jurisdiction. → (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.4), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.2), (JUR §1.3), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.2), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.6), (JUR §2.10)
Valuation Tribunal Service (VTS) The independent tribunal handling appeals against VOA business rate and council tax valuations. Relevant as a cost baseline for specialist valuation appeal bodies. → (JUR §2), (JUR §2.6)
Ver. A / Ver. B The two return distributions used throughout. Ver. A is the 73-observation UK historical equity return sequence (1947–2019). Ver. B is an idealised two-state distribution with the same mean and standard deviation. References throughout this paper to (WFR.A §A) through (WFR.A §E) refer to sections of the companion appendix paper, which contains the full simulation tables and model specification underlying the results presented here.
Visibility friction (Type II) The opacity of the relationship between what a taxpayer pays and what they receive in return, which causes the tax to be experienced as confiscation rather than participation.
Volunteer rate The proportion of DR lottery selectees who accept service and take up their seat within the service-acceptance window. Published continuously by the Administrator as a rolling figure, trailing average, and full historical series. The primary legitimacy signal for constituency dissolution; the input to which the constituency dissolution mechanism responds automatically. → (ADD §6), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.2), (GOV §7.4)
Vulnerability window The period between WDT introduction and the accumulation of sufficient mutual stake, track record, and constituency to make the institution’s political durability properties real rather than designed. The period during which the bootstrapping problem is most acute and the institution is most exposed to dismantling. → (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §6.4), (POL §6.5), (POL §8), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.8), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §2), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §11), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.3), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.5)
W
\(W_{min}\) The wealth level at which the logistic rate function begins to produce material liability, expressed in £m. A rate design parameter, not a population boundary: all UK adults are within the modelled taxable population. At the Balanced calibration, \(W_{min}\) = £2m. → (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.3), (ADD §2), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.3), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §5), (VAL §10.1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §5), (RATES §5.1), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.1), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.1), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.3), (SWEEPS §7.4), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §10), (SWEEPS §11), (SWEEPS §12), (SWEEPS §13), (SWEEPS §13.1)
WAS (Wealth and Assets Survey) The ONS longitudinal survey providing the primary UK household wealth dataset. Lost Official Statistics accreditation in June 2025; treated as indicative background only, supplemented by HMRC administrative data and Advani et al. (2020) IFS estimates.
Wealth as power The characterisation of large net worth as durable economic and institutional power that operates in the present, rather than as deferred consumption awaiting a future spending event. The basis for the WDT’s departure from consumption-tax logic at the upper end of the distribution. → (WP §A), (WP §A.3), (MF §4), (LR.B §16)
Wealth Delta Tax (WDT) A tax on the annual change in net worth above the exemption threshold. → (BEHAV §1), (BEHAV §3), (BEHAV §3.2), (BEHAV §5), (BEHAV §7.5), (BEHAV §6), (BEHAV §6.3), (BEHAV §7), (BEHAV §8), (BEHAV §8.1), (BEHAV §8.4), (BEHAV §8.5), (BEHAV §7.6), (BEHAV §7.7), (BEHAV §7.8), (BEHAV §7.9), (BEHAV §8.11), (BEHAV §9), (BEHAV §9.1), (BEHAV §9.2), (BEHAV §9.3), (BEHAV §9.4), (BEHAV §12.1), (BEHAV §13), (BEHAV.A §A), (BEHAV.A §A.2), (BEHAV.A §A.3), (BEHAV.A §A.4), (BEHAV.A §A.5), (BEHAV.A §A.6), (BEHAV.A §A.7), (BEHAV.A §B), (BEHAV.A §B.4), (BEHAV.A §B.5), (BEHAV.A §B.6), (BEHAV.A §B.7), (BEHAV.A §C), (BEHAV.A §C.2), (BEHAV.A §C.3), (BEHAV.A §D), (BEHAV.A §D.1), (BEHAV.A §D.2), (BEHAV.A §D.3), (BEHAV.A §D.4), (BEHAV.A §D.5), (CLOSE §1), (CLOSE §1.1), (CLOSE §1.2), (CLOSE §1.3), (CLOSE §2), (CLOSE §3), (CLOSE §4), (CLOSE §4.1), (CLOSE §4.2), (CLOSE §4.3), (CLOSE §4.4), (CLOSE §6), (CLOSE §7), (CLOSE §7.1), (CLOSE §7.2), (CLOSE §8), (CLOSE §8.1), (CLOSE §8.2), (CLOSE §8.3), (CLOSE §9), (CLOSE §9.2), (CLOSE §9.3), (CLOSE §10), (POL §1), (POL §2), (POL §3), (POL §3.2), (POL §3.7), (POL §4), (POL §5), (POL §5.1), (POL §5.3), (POL §5.4), (POL §5.6), (POL §5.7), (POL §5.8), (POL §6), (POL §6.1), (POL §6.2), (POL §6.3), (POL §6.7), (POL §7), (POL §8), (POL §8.1), (POL §8.2), (POL §8.3), (POL §8.4), (POL §8.5), (POL §8.6), (POL §8.7), (POL §8.8), (POL §10), (POL §A), (POL §A.1), (POL §A.2), (POL §A.3), (POL §A.4), (POL §A.5), (POL §A.6), (POL §A.7), (ENV §1), (ENV §2), (ENV §3), (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (ENV §4.2), (ENV §4.3), (ENV §4.4), (ENV §4.5), (ENV §4.6), (ENV §4.7), (ENV §4.8), (ENV §5), (ENV §6), (ENV §7), (ENV §8), (ENV §9), (ENV §9.2), (ENV §9.2.1), (ENV §9.2.2), (ENV §9.2.4), (ENV §9.4), (ENV §10), (FM §1), (FM §2), (FM §3), (FM §3.1), (FM §3.2), (FM §4), (MOD §1), (MOD §2), (MOD §3), (MOD §4), (SCOPE §1), (SCOPE §3.1), (SCOPE §3.2), (SCOPE §3.3), (SCOPE §7), (ADD §1), (ADD §2), (ADD §3), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §4), (ADD §9.2), (ADD §7), (ADD §7.1), (ADD §7.2), (ADD §7.3), (ADD §10), (ADD §10.2), (ADD §12), (ADD §13), (WP §1), (WP §1.1), (WP §2), (WP §2.1), (WP §2.2), (WP §2.3), (WP §2.4), (WP §2.5), (WP §2.6), (WP §2.7), (WP §3), (WP §3.1), (WP §3.2), (WP §3.4), (WP §3.4.1), (WP §3.5), (WP §3.6), (WP §3.7), (WP §3.8), (WP §4), (WP §4.1), (WP §4.2), (WP §4.3), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §6), (WP §7), (WP §7.1), (WP §7.2), (WP §7.3), (WP §8), (WP §8.1), (WP §8.2), (WP §8.3), (WP §B.2), (WP §8.5), (WP §8.7), (WP §9), (WP §9.1), (WP §9.2), (WP §9.3), (WP §9.5), (WP §10), (WP §A), (WP §A.1), (WP §A.2), (WP §A.3), (WP §A.4), (WP §A.5), (WP §B), (INST §1), (INST §2), (INST §2.2), (INST §2.3), (INST §3), (INST §3.1), (INST §3.2), (INST §4), (INST §4.1), (INST §5), (INST §5.1), (INST §5.2), (INST §5.3), (INST §5.4), (INST §6), (INST §6.1), (INST §6.2), (INST §6.3), (INST §6.4), (INST §7), (INST §7.1), (INST §7.2), (INST §7.3), (INST §8), (INST §9), (INST §9.1), (INST §9.2), (INST §9.3), (INST §10), (INST §10.2), (INST §10.3), (INST §10.4), (INST §11), (LDW §1), (LDW §1.1), (LDW §2), (LDW §2.2), (LDW §3), (LDW §3.2), (LDW §4), (LDW §4.2), (LDW §4.4), (LDW §4.5), (LDW §4.5.4), (LDW §5), (LDW §6), (LDW §6.1), (LDW §6.3), (LDW §6.4), (LDW §7), (LDW §7.1), (LDW §7.3), (LDW §7.4), (LDW §8), (FAL §1), (FAL §1.1), (FAL §1.2), (FAL §1.3), (FAL §2), (FAL §3), (FAL §7.1), (FAL §3.2), (FAL §3.3), (FAL §3.4), (FAL §3.5), (FAL §7.5), (FAL §4), (FAL §4.1), (FAL §4.2), (FAL §4.3), (FAL §4.4), (FAL §4.5), (FAL §5), (FAL §5.2), (FAL §5.3), (FAL §5.4), (FAL §7.4), (FAL §6), (FAL §7.2), (FAL §6.3), (FAL §6.4), (FAL §7), (FAL §7.3), (FAL §8), (FAL §10), (FAL §11), (FAL §12), (FAL §13), (FAL §A), (MF §1), (MF §2), (MF §3), (MF §3.2), (MF §3.3), (MF §4), (MF §6), (MF §7), (MF §8), (MF §9), (MF §9.1), (MF §9.4), (MF §9.4.2), (MF §9.4.4), (MF §9.4.5), (MF §9.4.7), (MF §9.4.8), (MF §11), (LR.A §1), (LR.A §2), (LR.A §2.1), (LR.A §2.3), (LR.A §3), (LR.A §3.1), (LR.A §3.2), (LR.A §3.3), (LR.A §4), (LR.A §4.1), (LR.A §4.3), (LR.A §5), (LR.B §1), (LR.B §2), (LR.B §3), (LR.B §4), (LR.B §5), (LR.B §6), (LR.B §7), (LR.B §8), (LR.B §9), (LR.B §10), (LR.B §11), (LR.B §12), (LR.B §13), (LR.B §14), (LR.B §15), (LR.B §16), (LR.B §17), (LR.B §18), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.2), (JUR §1.2.3), (JUR §1.3), (JUR §1.4), (JUR §1.5), (JUR §1.5.1), (JUR §1.5.2), (JUR §1.5.3), (JUR §1.5.4), (JUR §2), (JUR §2.2), (JUR §2.3), (JUR §2.4), (JUR §2.6), (JUR §2.8), (JUR §2.9), (JUR §2.10), (JUR §2.11), (VAL §1), (VAL §2), (VAL §2.2), (VAL §2.3), (VAL §2.4), (VAL §3), (VAL §3.1), (VAL §3.3), (VAL §4), (VAL §4.3), (VAL §5), (VAL §5.1), (VAL §5.2), (VAL §6), (VAL §6.3), (VAL §6.4), (VAL §6.5), (VAL §6.6), (VAL §7), (VAL §7.2), (VAL §7.3), (VAL §7.4), (VAL §7.5), (VAL §9), (VAL §10), (VAL §10.5), (VAL §10.6), (VAL §11.5), (VAL §13), (VAL §14), (VAL §14.3), (VAL §14.4), (VAL §15), (VAL §10.1), (VAL §4.4), (VAL §12.1), (CORP §1), (CORP §2), (CORP §2.1), (CORP §3), (CORP §4), (CORP §4.1), (CORP §5), (CORP §5.7), (CORP §6), (CORP §6.3), (CORP §7), (CORP §8), (CORP §10), (CORP §9.4), (CORP §11), (GOV §1), (GOV §2), (GOV §2.1), (GOV §4), (GOV §5), (GOV §5.2), (GOV §5.3), (GOV §7), (GOV §7.4), (GOV §6.4), (GOV §7.5), (RATES §1), (RATES §2), (RATES §3), (RATES §3.1), (RATES §4), (RATES §6), (RATES §6.1), (RATES §6.2), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.4), (RATES §8), (RATES §8.1), (RATES §8.2), (RATES §8.3), (RATES §10), (RATES §11), (SWEEPS §1), (SWEEPS §2), (SWEEPS §2.4), (SWEEPS §7), (SWEEPS §7.2), (SWEEPS §7.5), (SWEEPS §8), (SWEEPS §8.3), (SWEEPS §9), (SWEEPS §11)
Wealth Tax Commission The body that produced Advani et al. (2020), the most directly comparable prior UK wealth tax proposal to the WDT. Recommended a one-off wealth tax rather than an annual charge, primarily on administrative grounds. → (ENV §4), (ENV §4.1), (LR.B §8), (JUR §1), (JUR §1.2), (JUR §1.2.4), (JUR §1.4)
Working assumption A position adopted in the absence of Phase One evidence, on the basis of the best available adjacent evidence and first-principles reasoning, that Phase One is designed to test and, where necessary, correct. → (ADD §9), (ADD §10.1), (ADD §9.2), (WP §5), (WP §5.1), (WP §9), (WP §9.2), (MF §9), (MF §9.2)
Z
Zero-governance assumption The modelling convention applied after LRR fill in the historical sweep: the full burden of government expenditure is charged against the LRR each year with no Governing Council rate adjustments. Determines the LRR breach year. Produces a conservative bound on reserve durability; in practice the mandatory rate review mechanism in (GOV §6) would intervene before breach. → (RATES §6), (RATES §6.3), (RATES §7), (RATES §7.2), (RATES §7.3)